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Abstract 
Efficient processing of complex social and biological stimuli associated with threat is crucial for survival. 
Previous studies have suggested that threatening stimuli such as angry faces not only capture visual 
attention, but also delay the disengagement of attention from their location. However, in the previous 
studies disengagement of attention was measured indirectly and was inferred on the basis of delayed 
manual responses. The present study employed a novel paradigm that allows to directly examine the 
delayed disengagement hypothesis by measuring the time it takes to disengage the eyes from 
threatening stimuli. The results showed that participants were indeed slower to make an eye movement 
away from an angry face presented at fixation than from either a neutral or a happy face. This finding 
provides converging support that the delay in disengagement of attention is an important component of 
processing threatening information.  
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Angry faces hold the eyes  
 
 Research on visual attention has shown that certain simple stimuli, such as abrupt onsets, 
sudden motion or salient color singletons can capture attention automatically, irrespectively of the goals 
of the observer (Theeuwes, Olivers, & Belopolsky, in press; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). Orienting to these 
objects may be important because often they signal unexpected and potentially dangerous events in the 
environment. However, equally important is fast orienting to more complex biological and social stimuli 
that potentially can signal danger. For example, directing attention to an angry face, a spider or a snake 
can be of a great advantage and can help to quickly prepare an appropriate response.  
 Several researchers have proposed that complex biological stimuli associated with threat trigger 
an automatic orienting response (Ohman & Mineka, 2001; Vuilleumier, 2005). Presumably, such 
response has developed in the course of evolution in order to reduce potential harm inflicted by the 
threatening stimuli. In accordance with this view, recent studies have demonstrated that potentially 
dangerous objects, such as spiders, snakes or angry faces receive priority in visual selection. For 
example, in visual search tasks participants are faster to find an angry face among distractors than to 
find a happy or a sad face. As the time to find an angry face is less affected by the number of stimuli 
present in the visual field than search for other facial expressions this type of search is often classified as 
efficient (Fox et al., 2000; Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Similarly, participants are faster and 
more efficient to find snakes and spiders than non-threatening objects, like flowers or mushrooms 
(Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). These search advantage is further enhanced if participants have a 
specific phobia for snakes or spiders and this enhancement is phobia-specific, indicating that it is due to 
the fear experienced by the participants (e.g. Lipp, 2006).  
 Further evidence for prioritized attentional selection of threatening stimuli comes from a so-
called dot-probe paradigm, which is a modification of a classic spatial cueing task developed by Posner 
and colleagues (Posner, 1980). In this task participants are required to detect a target (i.e. a dot-probe), 
which can occur either at the location previously occupied by a threat-related stimulus (i.e. an angry 
face) or at the location of the non-threatening stimulus (a neutral or a happy face). Both stimuli are 
presented side by side and the location of the threatening stimulus is irrelevant to the task, since it does 
not predict the location of the target. It has been demonstrated that participants are faster to detect a 
dot-probe appearing at the location of a threat-related stimulus, suggesting that attention was directed 
to its location (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Fox et al., 2000; Mathews, Mackintosh, & 
Fulcher, 1997).   
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 The findings from visual search and cueing paradigms have commonly been interpreted as 
evidence that fear-related stimuli capture attention in an automatic bottom-up way (e.g., Mathews et al., 
1997; Ohman, Flykt et al., 2001; Ohman, Lundqvist et al., 2001). However, in visual search tasks the 
threat-related stimulus is often the target, which makes it difficult to isolate the bottom-up component 
associated with the threatening stimulus (Devue, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, submitted). Furthermore, 
recently Fox and colleagues (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Georgiou 
et al., 2005) have challenged the interpretation of results from dot-probe tasks. They pointed out that 
these studies cannot distinguish between a more efficient orienting to threat-related stimuli and a slower 
disengagement of attention from these stimuli once attention has been oriented to them (for a similar 
argument see also Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006). Fox and colleagues (Fox et al., 2001) presented 
faces (angry, happy or neutral) or words (threatening, positive or neutral) as exogenous cues. As 
expected, participants were faster in detecting targets occurring at the location of the cue (Mathews et 
al., 1997). However, there were no additional benefits associated with threatening cues, since response 
times on validly cued trials were similarly fast for all types of cues. Interestingly, invalid threat-related 
cues were associated with increased costs in reaction time, suggesting that participants had trouble 
disengaging attention from these cues (for a similar result see also Yiend & Mathews, 2001).  
 In a follow-up study (Fox et al., 2002) the delayed disengagement hypothesis was further 
investigated using the phenomenon of inhibition of return (IOR). IOR is thought to reflect a bias away 
from the recently attended locations and is manifested by slower RTs to targets at validly cued locations 
when the time between the cue and the target is extended. It has been suggested in the literature that 
IOR occurs after attention is disengaged from the cued location (Klein, 2000) and that IOR is postponed 
if attention lingers at the cued location. In a study by Fox and colleagues (2002) no inhibition of return 
(IOR) was observed at the location of the threat-related stimulus while typical IOR was elicited at the 
location of non-threatening stimuli. The absence of IOR at the threat-related stimulus indicates that 
attention was maintained at its location and suggests that the disengagement of attention was delayed.  
 The ability of threatening stimuli to delay disengagement of attention was tested more directly in 
a recent study by Georgiou et al (Georgiou et al., 2005). The authors presented either a fearful, neutral 
or happy face at fixation while participants had to discriminate onset targets in the periphery. The results 
showed that participants were slower in discriminating the target after a fearful face was presented.  
Based on this study and on the results of Fox and colleagues  (Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2002; 
Georgiou et al., 2005) it was proposed that threat-related objects may not necessarily facilitate the 
orienting of attention, but instead may delay the disengagement of attention from these threatening 
stimuli. Such delay in disengagement of attention could reflect the inborn desire to process the object of 
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potential threat in more depth. It makes ecological sense to monitor and evaluate potentially threatening 
stimuli and to be reluctant in leaving them unattended (Fox et al., 2001). Examining the object of 
potential threat in more detail gives the person more time to assess the danger and to come up with the 
most appropriate reacting strategy.  
 The goal of the present study was to critically test the delayed disengagement hypothesis by 
directly measuring the disengagement of attention from the threat-related face by means of eye 
movements. Many studies have shown that covert attention and saccades are tightly coupled (Belopolsky 
& Theeuwes, 2009; Deubel & Schneider, 1996). Importantly, it has been demonstrated that it is 
impossible to make a saccade without first shifting covert attention precisely to the saccade target 
location (Deubel & Schneider, 1996). The fact that covert attention precedes the eye movements in an 
obligatory fashion makes the oculomotor disengagement the most direct and sensitive measure of the 
time to shift attention away from the attended object (Brockmole & Boot, 2009).  
 In covert attention tasks (as in the study by Georgiou et al., 2005) the time-course of 
disengagement had to be approximated by presenting the face for 500 ms before the appearance of a 
peripheral target. The disengagement itself had to be inferred from the responses to the target and it is 
not clear how accurately attention had to be focused on the target in order to make a response. 
Furthermore, peripheral onset targets are known to capture attention in a bottom-up fashion (Yantis & 
Jonides, 1984), which can also cloud the measure of disengagement. In our task a schematic face was 
presented in the center of the screen and could have either an angry, happy or neutral expression. 
Observers had to determine whether the face was slightly tilted to the left or to the right and to make a 
saccade to a box located in the direction of the tilt. Importantly, the facial expression itself was irrelevant 
to the task. Therefore, in our task participants had to engage their attention on the face to determine the 
direction of the tilt and then to disengage it in order to make an eye movement.  
 According to the delayed disengagement hypothesis the emotional expression of the face should 
have an effect on the speed of disengagement. Specifically, we predicted that disengagement would be 
the slowest when an angry face was presented relative to when a happy or a neutral face was presented. 
In order to control for the low-level differences among different facial expressions we have included a 




Eighteen volunteers (10 females) from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam were paid to participate 
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in a 20 minute session. Their age varied between 19 and 28, with a mean age of 22. They all had normal 
or corrected to normal visual acuity and normal color vision.  
Apparatus 
Eye movements were recorded with EyeLink II tracker (500 Hz temporal and 0.2° spatial 
resolution). Eye movement was considered a saccade when its velocity exceeded 35˚/s and its 
acceleration exceeded 9500˚/s2.  
Stimuli, Design &  Procedure. 
 The stimuli were presented against a white background (90 cd/m2) and consisted of a schematic 
face (2.8˚x 3.2˚), presented at the fixation and two boxes (2.4˚x 2.8˚, 5 pixel wide) presented 8˚ to 
the left and to the right of the fixation. The faces used were identical to those used by  Lundqvist & 
Öhman (Lundqvist & Ohman, 2005). They could have either neutral, happy or angry expression and 
could be tilted 10˚ either to the left or to the right of the vertical plane. The face was drawn in black and 
the rest of the stimuli were dark gray (27 cd/m2). One group of participants was presented with an 
upright face, while another group of participants were presented with the same faces, but inverted. The 
between-subject manipulation was chosen in order to avoid potential carry-over effects that upright faces 
could have on the processing of inverted faces (Lipp, Price, & Tellegen, 2009). 
 Participants were seated approximately 75 cm from the screen. The trial started with a fixation 
point (0.5˚), which stayed on the screen for random time between 1150 and 1650 ms. It was followed 
by a presentation of a schematic face at the fixation for 2000 ms. Participants were instructed to 
determine in which direction the face was tilted and to make an eye movement to the box positioned in 
that direction. Hence, if the face was tilted to the left, participants had to make a saccade to the box on 
the left, and when the face was tilted to the right, participants had to make a saccade to the box on the 
right (see Figure 1). Participants were informed that the expression of the face was irrelevant to the 
task.  
Insert Figure 1 
  The face was equally likely to be tilted either to the left or to the right and there was an equal 
number of different facial expressions in a block of trials. All types of trials were randomly mixed within a 
block. For each condition (upright face or inverted face) there were 120 trials in total divided in blocks of 
30 trials each. Before the start of the experiment participants received a block of 30 practice trials. If 
during a trial participants moved their eyes in a wrong direction they heard a tone. Participants also 
received feedback about their accuracy and reaction time after each block. They were encouraged to 
respond quickly and accurately.  
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Results 
 One participant in the upright face condition was replaced because of a high error-rate 
(>10%). Trials in which participants responded faster than 80 ms or slower than 500 ms were excluded 
from the analysis. This led to a loss of approximately 4% of the trials.    
 The saccade latencies for the upright and inverted face conditions are presented in Figure 2. A 
mixed-effects ANOVA with condition (upright or inverted) as between-subject factor and emotional 
expression (angry, happy or neutral) as within-subject factor showed only significant interaction between 
the condition and expression (F(2, 32) = 4.97, p<.05). There was no main effect of condition (F(1, 16) = 
0.20, p=.67) and a marginal effect of emotional expression (F(2, 32) = 3.02, p=0.06). Planned 
comparisons showed that in the upright face condition the emotional expression of the face had an effect 
on saccade latency (F(2, 16) = 10.61, p<.005). Participants were 12 ms slower when an angry face was 
presented at the fixation compared to a happy face (t(8) = 3.90, p < 0.005). Eye movements following 
an angry face were also slower (8 ms) than for the neutral face (t(8) = 3.11, p < 0.05). There was no 
significant difference between the happy face and the neutral face (3 ms; t(8) = 1.67, p = 0.13). 
However in the inverted face condition, there was no effect of the emotional expression whatsoever (F(2, 
16) = 0.40, p=.68).  
  
Insert Figure 2 
 
 Overall, participants were quite accurate in both upright and inverted face conditions (97% 
correct). ANOVA on accuracy did not reveal any significant effects or interactions.   
 
Discussion 
 The present results clearly show that angry facial expressions tend to hold the eyes and delay 
disengagement of attention. When participants had to determine the orientation of an angry face the 
disengagement of the eyes from it was delayed relative to when either happy or neutral facial 
expressions were presented. Interestingly, there was no difference in disengagement between happy and 
neutral faces, suggesting that delay in disengagement was specific to angry faces. Furthermore, there 
was no difference in disengagement among different expressions when the faces were inverted, 
indicating that the low-level features were not responsible for this effect.  
 It is important to realize that in our task the facial expression was completely irrelevant: 
participants only had to determine the orientation of the face and make a saccade in the appropriate 
direction.  We believe that the task of orientation discrimination engaged attention, which was 
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subsequently disengaged when saccade had to be made. One could argue that the face tilt was very 
salient and its discrimination did not require attention. This is highly unlikely given that attention is 
needed even for detection of very simple features, such a color pop-out (Theeuwes, Van Der Burg, & 
Belopolsky, 2008).  Therefore, a much more demanding discrimination task certainly requires the 
engagement of attention.   
 Despite being irrelevant, threatening information conveyed by angry emotional expression 
delayed disengagement, suggesting that processing of such information is largely automatic. This is 
consistent with previous studies that showed that the amygdala - a subcortical structure that is 
specialized in detection of fear-related stimuli - is activated very rapidly, requires minimal attentional 
resources (e.g., Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001) and can operate without conscious 
awareness (Pasley, Mayes, & Schultz, 2004).  
  Our results confirm and expand the results from previous studies that measured disengagement 
of covert attention (Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005). In the present study we 
recorded eye movements and were able to directly assess the time-course of disengagement of attention 
from threat-related faces. Eye movements allow us to select and track the most important information in 
the environment by directing the high-resolution fovea to the locations of interest. This is particularly 
important when confronted with dangerous objects in the environment, which we do not want to leave 
out of sight. Since eye movements provide a good indication of where the cognitive resources are 
allocated to and for how long (Just & Carpenter, 1980), the delayed disengagement of the eyes from the 
angry faces suggests that extended monitoring of this potentially threatening information was initiated 
automatically. According to one hypothesis this delayed disengagement of attention can be related to 
behavioral freezing, frequently observed when an animal is faced by a predator (Fox et al., 2001; Le 
Doux, 1996). This freezing might be an evolutionary mechanism developed in order to help the animal to 
stay undetected and perhaps to develop an escape option before leaving the predator unattended. 
Indeed, shortly before they eyes leave fixation, the processing resources shift to the location of the 
future fixation (Deubel & Schneider, 1996), leaving the individual vulnerable to attack. Therefore, 
disengagement of the eyes from the source of threat only makes sense when the safety plan is 
developed and is ready to be executed. This view of delayed disengagement as a separate monitoring 
component of reaction to threat can explain the paradox that threatening stimuli are generally detected 
and processed faster, but at the same time require more attention and trigger elaborate processing.
 In other view, delayed disengagement from threat has been suggested to represent maladaptive 
form of behavior since it has been primarily observed in high-anxious individuals (Fox et al., 2001; Fox 
et al., 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005). Specifically, it has been proposed that the bias to maintain attention 
at the source of threat could be related to the increased levels of anxiety (Compton, 2000). Note that 
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threat monitoring function that is common to all individuals could be exaggerated in high-anxious 
individuals.  Manual reaction time tasks could be sensitive enough to detect the delayed disengagement 
of attention in high-anxious people, but might be not sensitive enough to detect it in low-anxious people. 
This could be the reason why we were able to observe delayed disengagement of the eyes in a random 
sample of college students. In the future studies it would be interesting to examine whether angry faces 
hold the eyes even more in high-anxious individuals.  
 To summarize, our results show that threatening faces can hold the eyes. Even though a 
threatening face may be unpleasant people have trouble moving their eyes away even when they are 
instructed to do so. These findings provide direct support for the delayed disengagement hypothesis (Fox 
et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005). In addition to frequently reported fast orienting of 
attention to threatening information (e.g., Mineka & Ohman, 2002), the delayed disengagement of 
attention constitutes another important behavioral component, which might have evolved because of the 
need to monitor the threatening information and to have time to develop an escape plan before leaving 
the source of threat unattended. 
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Figure 1. Examples of the stimulus displays used in the experiment. Participants had to make an eye 
movement to the box in the direction of which the face was tilted. The facial expression was irrelevant to 
the task. 
 
Figure 2. Mean correct reaction times as a function of facial expression. The error bars represent 
normalized standard errors of the mean for within-subject design within each condition (Loftus & Masson, 
1994).  
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